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This paper grew out of an attempt at a systematic evaluation of the
theory of effective protection in light of the earlier work of Ramaswami
and Srinivasan (1969) and it dedicated to the memory of the late Ramaswami.
The research of the former author has been supported by the National Science
Foundation.
The theory of effective orotection has recently been evolved to develop
a concept of protection which; in the presence of traded factors of pro-
duction, would be able to ansv/er the same set of questions that nominal
tariffs on commodities do in their absence.
With tariffs on inputs and outputs clearly affectini^ the profitability
of, and hence the resource utilisation in, alternative processes in an
economy, the concept of the effective rate of protection (ERP) has come to
be applied to processes of production, or more precisely to the domestic
value added in these processes. Hiis reflects, in turn, the basic concern
of trade theorists in the resource-allocational impact of tariff structures.
This paper examines the ERP concept critically and derives a set of
sufficient conditions under which it correctly predicts the resource-
allocational impact of a tariff structure. In light of this analysis, it
also pinpoints the rationale underlying the Ramaswarai-Srinivasan "imoossi-
bility theorem' (1971) which states that there is in general no ERP index
that will predict resource flows once substitution betv7een domestic and
imported inputs is admitted.
In a companion paper, we examine the validity of the ERP concept under
the assumption of monopolv power in trade and also explore further the
Ramaswami-Srinivasan model to establish parametric conditions under which
the ERP concept could successfully predict resource allocation. We also
examine tliere the recent claims that the LTlP-rankinps of activities are
tantamount to a chain of 'comparative advantage."
I : Tlie ERP Concept
Itie concept of the effective protective rate (ERP) seems to have been
independent Iv evolved by Barber (1955) and by Travis (1952). It was. how-
ever., developed and put into effective circulation by several economists
working independently of one another: Corden (1966) and Johnson (1965) in
pioneering theoretical contributions, and Balassa (1965) in the context of
empirical work on tariff measurement.
lliere has subsequently been a phenomenally rapid growth of analytical
literature. The bulk of it has been in the mould of partial-equilibrium
analysis as was indeed the case with the Corden, Johnson and Balassa papers
(cf. Anderson and Naya, 1969: and Clark Leith, 1968). However, the more im-
portant \7ork has attempted analysis of the problem, usinr: general-eauilibrium
models, as is indeed the onlv correct approach: chief ar;onc: the contributors *
in this area have been Tan (19 70), Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1971), Corden
(1969) and Ruffin (1969). At the same tine, a flood of empirical literature
has appeared, with calculations far outpacing? the clarification and legi-
timation of the concent (cf. Balassa, 1965 ; Basevi, 1966, Lewis and
Guisinger, 1968) and thus almost creatin<? a vested interest against the con-
clusions of general-equilibrium analysis, to be discussed below, whicn are
generally devastating to the ERP concept's analytical legitimacy and practical
utility!
The P2RP concept was developed presumably by analogy with the nominal
tariff concept. Tfius, if v;e define:
V. = value added at domestic prices per unit outout of i in the
-,
process; and
V. = value added at international prices ner unit output of i in
J
the process,
3.
then the analogy with the nominal tariff suggests that we should define ERP
in the j-process as:
(1 + ERP) V." = V.
J .1
It
V. - V.
.'. ERP = -^ n—L- (1)
so that it follo\-7S that the ERP measures the proportionate increment in value
added between the free-trade and the tariff situation (the former implving
V." and the latter, V.).
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The same formula can be rewritten in two alternative forms. Letting
F Finternational unit prices be P. and P. for the i th output and the ith
input respectively, and using the standard Leontief terminology to represent
input-coefficients as a., (i = l,...,n), we can write:
" F " F
V. = P. - Z P. a.
.
J
-1 i=l ^ ^3
y "^ F
V. = P. (1+t.) - I P. (l+t.)a..
.1 .1 J ^_1 1 1 iJ
F. ; „ F UA77n
P / t . - Z P . ' a
P. - z, P, a.
.
provided we make two critical assumptions: that the international prices
are fixed (the small-country assumption) and that the a..'s are unchaneine
ij - -
between the free-trade and the tariff situation. Tlien, assuming international
prices to be unity of choice of units, we can rewrite (1) as follows:
n
t. - Z a. .t.
J i=l "-J "
ERP = (2)
n
1 - la..
i=l ^^
This defines the ERP in terms of the tariff rates and the iraoorted
factor-coefficients. There also follow the well-knoi^n results (cf. Corden,
1966) that:
if t. = t., then ERP = t. = t.;
if t. > t., then ERP > t. > t.; and
-11 J 1
if t. < t., then ERP < t. < t..
J 1 J 1
We could also rewrite the ERP-formula directly in terms of domestic
factor payments:
V. = Z r.f.. where i = l....,n are the doirestic factors emnloyed
1 i=l 1 ij in the i th process, f.. are the domestic factor
1.1
inputs-coefficients, and r. is the rental of factor
i at equilibrium factor prices in the free-trade
situation;
n , . ,
V. = Z r. f.. where r. is the rental of factor i at equilibrium
J i=l 1 11 1 ^ dfactor prices in the tariff situation and f.. are
ij
the domestic factor input-coefficients in the tariff
situation.
Then:
r, , d d .
L (r. f.. -r.f..)
i=l 1 11 1 13
ERP = i_i (3)
m
T. r.f..
i=l ^ ^^
As soon as formula (1) is thus translated into formulae (2) and (3),
it becomes clear that whenever a..'s can chan«2e between the free-trade and
11
the tariff situations, thanks to substitution possibilities, we can choose
from (at least) three alternative ERP definitions. In terms of (1), these
are defined as:
(i) ''Free Trade" (Coefficients) ERP: In this case, the a..'s of the
II
free-trade situation are used to evaluate both V. and V. : thus, in the
3 J
tariff-situation, in evaluatin^^ V., we use the free-trade a..'s but tariff-
J 1.1
inclusive domestic prices;
(ii) "I'ariff" (Coefficients) ERP: In this case, the a..'s of the
II
tariff situation are used to evaluate both V. and V. : thus, in the free-
J 1
trade situation, in evaluatinsi V. , v/e use the free-trade prices but the
tariff-situation coefficients; and
(iii) '"True" EIIP : In this case, sug'^ested by Naya and Anderson (1969),
the a..'s of both situations are used: the tariff-situation a..'s for
ij x.l
evaluating V. and the free-trade a. . 's for evaluating; V. .
J ij 3
It may be re-er.iphasised that all three definitions yield identical re-
sults when the a..'s are invariant,
ij
In this context, it is useful to note that the EPJ" definitions (i)
and (ii) are only approximations to the ''true ' definition (iii) and are to
be discussed only insofar as the "true'' definition is theoretically proper
but empirically unuseable. In addition to these three "traditional" ERP
definitions, we will introduce later in our analvsis another, "new" de-
finition based on the "price of value-added" due to Corden (1969).
P.ecall. for example, the problem in consumer theory of ranking the
commodity bundles bought by a consumer in two periods according to his
preferences when both the relative prices and total expenditures differ
between periods. Tliis can be done when two measures of real expenditure
of one of the periods (obtained by deflating the money expenditure by the
Laspyere and Pasche index of prices of that period relative to the other
period as base) both shov; a fall or rise as compared to the other period.
Anderson and Naya ( ) have a useful, partial-equilibrium analysis of
the ERP problem in this context.
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II : Tti^ Objective and Structure of the Analysis
with the ERP Concept
The formulation of the ERP concept, in either formula (1) or formula
(3); is in terms of the increment in value added which characterises the
tariff-situation vis-a-vis the free-trade situation.
Tliat the activity which is characterised by a higher (proportionate)
increment in value added, and hence by a higher ERP, should also have at-
tracted greater domestic resources seems intuitively plausible: and hence
the analysis has been centered on this question.
However, resource-allocation may be construed in two different ways,
both of which are considered in this paper. We may ask:
(i) whether the gross-output changes move in the same direction as
ERP ranking: i.e. whether (x/y) increases, for example, in the tariff-
situation if ERP > ERP ; and
X y
(ii) whethe'r the domesti c factors move between activities in the same
direction as E}IP rankings; i.e. \/hetner K and L Increase, and K and LXX ' y V
decrease, for examnle, in the tariff-situation, if ERP > ERP .
X V
We next note that, since tariffs can be imposed on both outouts and the
traded factors/inputs, the analysis of whether ERP-rankings can predict
resource-allocation (in either of the two senses distinguished above) can
distinguish betv;een t^^?o polar cases: (i) where there is an output-tarif f
;
and (ii) where there is an innut-tarif f
.
X and y denote the levels at which processes x and y are respectively
operated. ERPjj and ERPy represent the effective protective rates on the
processes x and v respectively.
K and L are the given, domestic factor supplies; the suffixes indicate
the employment of these factors in processes x and y.
***
Tan (1970) uses output-tariffs in his analysis whereas Ramaswami and
Srinivasan (1970) take inrut-trade-subsidy in their analysis.
Our procedure in this paper will, therefore, be to analyse in a general-
equilibrium framework the feasibility of predicting resource-allocational
effects via ERP-ranking, using both the notions of resource-allocational
effects distinguished above and also distinguisliing between output-tariffs
and input-tariffs.
In doing so, ue use a succession of production models, while not speci-
fying trade or consumption explicitly. Clearly this is enough since our
purpose is merely to analyse the resource-allocational impact of the tariff
situation: and, vjith international prices given
,
the problem reduces merely
to an examination of the oroduction model chosen.
Further note that in the traditional production model of trade theory,
non-traded domestic factors produce traded commodities; and gross-outputs
are the same as value-added, however, in the ERP theory, we depart from the
traditional model in one essential respect: one or more factors must be
traded. Hence their prices are given but their quantities become dependent
variables, in contrast to the traditional model where all factors have their
quantities exogenously specified but their prices endogenous ly determined.
Thus, all the production models which are used to explore the ERP theory must
allow for one or more factors whose prices are exogenouslv fixed and whose
quantities are dependent variables: and this would suffice to capture the
essential feature of the ERP problem. Hence, the phrase "traded" factors can
equally be changed to: "fixed-price, variable-quantity" factors in the
models, denoting thei r coefficients per unit output as a..'s.
We also initially confine our analysis to production models where the
primary domestic factors are directly employed in producing outputs which
are traded, instead of producing intermediates V7hich in turn are also
emploved in producing these final outputs. This also rules out models
where a product is both a final-demand and an intermediate .c^ood. Finallv,
we rule out the iiossibility of the "traded" factors being identical with
"domestic" factors: the tivro are treated as exclusive categories.
Note again that the analysis is conducted throughout on the assu^nptlon
of ^ivcn international prices.
Tlius we vji]l not initiallv consider a model suqii as the follov;ing:
X = X(K ,L .0 ,M ) ; K_ + K + K ^ K ;xx'xxQ X y
Y = Y(K^,L^,Qy,M^) ; Lq + L^ + Ly < L ;
= Q^ + 0^ = Q(K^,Lq)
where X, Y, and are t\JO final outputs and an intermediate respectively,
produced by primary domestic factors, K and L, and imported factor, ;1.
Such a model V70uld be X = X(K ,L ,Y ) ; K + K < KXXX X y
Y = Y(K ,L ,X ) ; L + L ^ L
y y y x y
X = X — X
n V
Y = y - Y
n X
where X and Y are the net final-demand availabilities of commodities x
and y, after intermediate use (Y and X ) has been accounted for.
X y
*ft5V
Hence, we cannot have a model such as the follcsjing:
X = X(K ,L )XX
Y = Y(K ,L )
y y
K + K = K. + K.
X y cl £
L + L = L, + L^
X y d f
where K and L are the given 4°P1?^J^\5. stocks of factors K and L, and K^
and L are the quantities of imported (exported) factors
.
Ill: Successive Mode ls Sufficient for ERP Theory
We begin by formulating models which provide sufficient conditions
for the ERP-ranking to predict resource-allocational effects. In the next
section, hcn-jever, we consider the R.amaswaini-Srinivasan "impossibility"
theorem on this question.
Model I: Traditional Model: Two Primary
,
Domes ti c Factors Producing Two
Traded Goods
VJe begin with the traditional model, which is essentially a special
case of the models we will consider presently, wnere a..'s = 0. It is there-
1.1
fore also a case where we can allow only for output-tariff changes: with im-
ported factors /inputs at zero level, there are necessarily no input- tariffs
to be investigated.
Hie traditional production model is basically the following:
X = X(K^,L^) (I.l)
Y = Y(K^,L^) (1.2)
K + K < K (1.3)
X y
L + L < L (1.4)
X y
Tne foreign commodity price ratio P /P is specified exogenously and constant
for this small country. Under free trade this will also equal the domestic
price ratio P /P . Perfect competition, competitive pricing and the standard
restrictions on production functions obtain.
National tariffs on commodities x and y ad valorem rates t and t will
X V
P'^ P^(l+t ) . ^/ /^,NX X X '^ d(x/Y)
result in
-^ =
———
— . We know then that —— r- > at points of
P P (1+t ) d(P /P'')
y y y x y
In this two-commodity model, it is clear that one of the two tariff
rates would have to be a trade subsidy because, with trade, one comr.ioditv must
be exported and one imported. For simplicity, however, v/e talk of tariff rates
in the text.
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d(L,^)
incomplete specialisation in production. We also know that —
—
-—
— > and
ui- ^ P<^ d(p''/p'')d(k ) P XVX X
— > Q_ After-tariff -— is creater than free-trade
d(p'^/p") P^XV V
P^
pf
—r (= -— ) if t > t . If we can then show that the increment in P /Ppd pf X y XV
y y
(i.e. t > t ) also implies that E!IP > ERP , then ERP theorv is clearly
X y X y
valid in this model.
This is indeed the case as:
Unit value added at free-trade prices = P ,P
X y
Unit value added at tariff-inclusive prices = P (1+t ) ,P (1+t )X X V V
P (1+t )-P
,*, ERP = L- = t : and
X P X'
X
P (1+t )-P
ERP = -^—^ = t
v P V
y
.*. ERP > ERP
X y
Hence, we have deduced that if ERP > ERP
,
then d(K ) > 0, d(L ) > and
X y XX
d(X/Y) > 9, so that the resource-allocational effects in both the ways defined
earlier are predictable from ERP rankings in the traditional model. Note
also that, in the absence of traded inputs, value added in each activity
equals the value of output of that activity. Therefore, the units of x and
y themselves serve as physical uiiits of value added in their production.
Ilodel II: Imported Innut a..'s Constant and Strictly Positive and Two Primarv,
'
1,1
^ ^-^
iJomestic factors :
Let us now take a production model v;ith primary, domestic factors with
substitution among themselves and imported inputs that are used in fixed
proportion to output:
X = :iin [X(K ,L ), A^ /a. ] (II. 1)XX ix IX
Y = Min [Y(K ,L ), A. /a. ] (II. 2)
y y ly xy
11.
K + K £ K (II. 3)
X y
L + L ^ L (II. 4)
X y
where a. and a. are the fixed imported-input coefficients; K , K , L , L
IX ly X y X y
represent domestic factor inputs; and A. , A. represent imported inputs.
In this model, it is obvious that the price-ratio relevant for resource
allocation is P /P where P . P are net realisation per unit of output of
X y X y
X and y respectively: i.e. P =P-a. P/,,P =? -a.,,Pr where P , P
X X XX fx y y ij ly x v
are domestic prices per unit of x and v respectively and P. , P. are domestic
' IX ly
prices per unit of imported inputs used in the production of x and y. It is
dfX/Y) '^'^x "^K
also clear that ^^^^-^-^ > 0, — > and > 0.
d(p"/P^) d(p"/p'^) d(P^/p")XV X y ^ y
If we now shovT that, after tariff, — v/ill be larger compared to its
p"
y
free trade value if and only if EPJ > ERP , we would have shown the pre-
X y
dictive ability of ERP. Tuis is indeed the case.
For,
--) > i-
lp"y tariff \p" free-trade
y y
is equivalent to:
(P") (P'')
'^
x^ tariff
^
^ y^ tariff
(P") (P"")
x free-trade y free-trade
The latter ineaualitv, hOT-zever, is equivalent to EPJ > ERP . This follows
x y
because P (P ) represents the domestic value added per unit level of process
^ ^ ' (pS ^
,' \ J u ^ after tariff ,\ , „_,_,x(v) and hence •> !> equals ERP
I rp") ' ^
X free-trade
This model, and the validity of ERP theor*; in its framework, were
forr.ially developed earlier bv Tan (1970) and are implicit in the work of
Corden (1966).
^
12.
Note that we have incorporated the effects of output as well as input
tariffs in this analysis. Hence we have shown that the ERP theory succeeds,
for both output and input tariffs, in predictinc; correctly both the ^ross-
output and orimary-resource allocational effects.
It is important to note again that the imported input is used in fixed
proportions with output and hence the physical unit of measurement of out-
put serves also as the physical unit of measurement of value added. [Of
course, unlike in the traditional Model I, price of value added is not the
price per unit of outout but the price net of imported inputs.] And this
accounts for the success of ERP theory in this model.
Model III: One Primary Domes tic Factor and One Imported Input with Sub-
stitution Afflfi#feg^hem, Producing IVo Traded Goods ;
When we specify one domestic and ore imported factor, with substitution
among them, we get a knife-edge model, which we now proceed to analyse. Thus
consider the following model:
X = X(L ,1 ) (III.l)X X
Y = Ya ,1 ) (III. 2)
y y
L + L $ L (III. 3)
where I and I represent the imported-factor utilisation in goods x and y
X y
respectively and L is now the only primary, domestic factor.
With P /P given exogenously, it follows that, in a perfectly competi-
tive situation, the real wage of labour in activities x and v will be deter-
minate and knife-edge specialisation on either commodity x or y will follow
* 9xWith P./P = 9x/3I and piven P./P
, icrr is determined: therefore,IX X - X x dl
given constant returns to scale, 3x/9L is also determined. So is
X
3Y/9L . Therefore, siven P /P
,
labour i^rill tjo to whichever activity that
y X y' -
gives the higher real wage, except for a borderline Ricardian case.
13.
except for a borderline, Ricardian possibility.
In this mode], the phvsical unit of outnut clearly cannot serve as a
unit for raeasureraent of value added since substitution between domestic and
foreign input is feasible in production. Tlierefore, the three i-neasures of
I'HIP outlined earlier, depending; as they do on output units for measurement
of value added, cannot be expected to be of help in predictin.':: the resource
allocation effects of a tariff structure: and indeed this is so. However
there i_s a natural physical unit for value added in this model: namelv, the
unit of the onlv domestic factor of production, labour. Once ERP is defined
in terms of the price of labor, i.e., the wage rate, it is of predictive
value in both the gross-output and primary-factor allocational senses dis-
tinguished by us.
'riiese conclusions can be illustrated by means of a simple example. Let
us take a Cobb-Douglas production function for each of the tv7o activities:
a 1-a
X = L ^ I ^ (III. 4)XX
a 1-a
Y = L ^ I "" (III. 5)
y y
Tlien, assuming: (i) that the tariff is levied only on the imported input so
that the tariff-inclusive price per unit of this input is P., (ii) the world
prices of x and y are unity by choice of units, v/e can solve for the marginal
value product of labour in each activity as a function of P.. Thus:
1-a
X
/1-a \ ^x
1-a
Z
I 1-a \ V
w (P.) = a t-^l (III. 7)
V 1 y \ P. ,
V 1 ;
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All the available labour will be devoted to the production of x(y) if
w (P.) > (<) w (P.). Also, civen a ^ a , vj (P.) and w (P.) will cross each
X 1 y X X y X 1 y i
other at unique P"^ given by:
(III. 8)
The w (P.) and w (P.) schedules are drawn in Figure (1), their inter-
section being at P.. In free trade, the economy is in equilibrium at P. =
OF, and the specialization in production is in commodity y as w (at A) >
w (at B). VVith a tariff on the imported input 'i', leading to domestic,
tariff-inclusive P. = OT, the specialisation shifts to commodity x as
w (at C) > xj (at D). Thus all the available labour is shifted to commodity
X y
x: and the relative output of x shifts fron zero to infinity. Let us now
examine the perform.ance of our measures of ERP as predictors of this shift.
It is immediately obvious that the "true" measure is totally useless.
For. the fact that there is only one domestic factor implies that value added
per unit of output (in the post-tariff as well as in the free-trade situation)
is nothing but the wage cost per unit of output. Since the units of output
have been so chosen that the price ner unit is unity, the wage cost per unit
of output is also the wage share in the cost per unit. Given a Cobb-Douglas
production function, this share is a constant. Hence ERP = ERP =
X y
according to the 'true" measure! It is thus of no predictive value whatever.
It is equally easy to construct a numerical example where either the
post-tariff or the free-trade measure fails to predict the resource shift.
For instance, choose a = 1/4, a = 1/2. Let free trade. P. = 1 and the post-
X y 1
tariff P. = 1/2 so that the imported input enjoys an ad valorem subsidy at
the rate of 50 nercent. Under free trade, w = 1/4 and w = 27/256 and hence
V X
15.
Wj^.Wy
A
\ V
B'\\ -
^
^V^C\ D ^^J^x'^-'\
X^yCl'
1
a. >
•"l
Figure (1)
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production is specialised in y. After subsidy w = 1/2 and w = 11 111 so
that w > w and production is specialised in x. iloM it can be checked
X y
that the post-subsidy imported input per unit of output is 3/2 in the pro-
duction of X and 1 in the production of y. Using these post-subsidy input
coefficients we get:
Process
Value added per unit of output
EPJ
Post-subsidy prices Free-trade prices
y
X
1/2
1/4 -1/2
oo
-3/2
Thus ERP > ERP and this will lead us to exnect no shift in labour and
y X
hence in gross output, contrary to the actual shift from y to x. Of course,
in this nurierical example ERP based on free trade input coefficient will
nredict resource movement correctly. But the reader can easily construct
an example where this measure of ERP also fails as a resource-allocational
predictive device.
But we can manage to rescue a concept of ERP which will suffice to
predict resource movenient in this model. We do this bv noting that the
natural physical unit for value added in this model is labour. Defining
EPv?, therefore, in terms of its nricc, wa m.ust clearly -get the correct pre-
diction. Thus, if there is initial Iv soecialization in coramoditv y, this
must imply w > w and if labour and hence output must shift to commodity
y X
x, this must imnly that in the nost-tariff situation w > w . And, of
X y
course, this reversal in inequality in wages is possible onlv if w is raised
proportionately more by the tariff change than w . Ijut this is onlv another
way of saying that we ir,ust have ERP > ERP , v/here the ERP is defined as the
X y
proportionate increment in the price of value added ' in the process thanks
17.
ft
to the tariff change.
But it must be noted that, while our present model permits us to
define a measure of ERP which correctly predicts resource-allocational
effects of the tariff structure, the reason being that we have a natural
physical unit of value added in the model thanks to labour being the only
primary domestic factor, this is of no use from a practical point of view.
Presumably one wants to construct an ERP index so as to be able to predict
the resource-allocational impact of a tariff structure without having to
solve the entire general equilibrium system. But, defining ERP in terms of
the proportional increment in the 'price of value added" means just that
ERP's cannot be computed without solving the general equilibrium system
first! For, we have to know the marginal value product of labour in each
process before and after the change in the tariff structure if we are to
calculate the ERP's as redefined in this subsection: and if we know these,
then we have already solved the general equilibrium system and hence know
already the resource-allocational shifts, so that the ERP calculation is
altogether redundant from that point of view.
Two further observations are in order.
Note however that it is quite possible in this knife-edge model for
the tariff structure to shift in a v/ay which m-erely accentuates the pro-
fitability of a process on which the econonv is already specialised in the
initial situation: hence, the ERP measure would nredict a resource shift
x/hich does not occur. However, this is hardly a nualification as all re-
sources are already epployed in the process with the higher ERP and this
is nothing but a "corner" situation. . Nonetheless, from a practical point
of view, it is important to remember that it would be wrong to infer from
the ERP ranking that resources had actually been pulled towards the higher-
ERP process by the tariff structure: all that can strictly be clainied is
that resources will not have been pulled in the direction of the process
with the lower ERP.
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(i) A weak relaxation of the present model, in which the analysis
above still anplies, is where there are nore than one primary factor but
they are used in an identical, fixed proportion (i.e. one man to one spade)
throufrhout the economy.
(ii) IJhile our analysis has been presented, using an input-tariff,
it applies equally to the other polar case of an output tariff. We briefly
indicate, for Cobb-Doublas production functions again, hoi/ the ERP measure,
in terms of proportionate increment in the price of value added, would still
work for a change in the output tariff. Using identical Cobb-Doublas pro-
duction functions, (III. 4) and (III. 5), we now choose units such that P.
and P are unity.
X -^
It then follows that:
1-a
X
a
w = a (1-a ) ^ (III. 9)XXX
1-a
1-a 1-a
I V a a
w (P ) = a (v-^) " = a (1-a ) ^ • P ^ (III. 10)y y y Ly y y y
Therefore, there exists a unique P , say P" , such that:
y y
w (P") = w
y y X
If P > P . then w (P ) > w and all L will move to industry v: and if
y y y y X "
P < P , then all L will move to industry x. Thus, when a tariff on industry
v increases P from belOTj P'' to above P**, the specialisation in production,
y y y
and in domestic-factor (L) allocation, will shift from industry x to industry
y.
This is seen via Figure (2). There, the scliedules w and w (P ) are
" X y y
drawnj for the case of Cobb-Douglas production functions. Tnree alternative
19,
Wj^.Wy
w.
Figure (2)
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shapes of w (P ), depending, on whether a = 1/2, are illustrated. Takinc the
case where a = 1/2, if we assune that a tariff on y shifts P from OX across
V
"
y
P to OZ, then the econoiny will shift from specialisation on x to specialisation
on V. Under free-trade, labour xjill go to industry x because its eauilibriun
war^e is higher there than in y: ES > QS; under protection, on the other hand,
it will go to industry y: RZ > FZ. At the same time, on the EPvP definition
in terms of proportionate increraent in the ''price of value added,'' EPJ* > ERP :
y X
RZ - QS ^ ZF - ZF , P^ ^ ZF ,. ^. „„_, ^, , i- <: . \
— 7—-- >
,r=r— (or -p-r- > :=:=: = 1). tlence, EP^P theory holas for output
l{0 ^r l^b ^r
*
price-changes as x^ell.
Model IV: Substitution betv^een "Value-Added" and Imported Factors :
We now assume two domestic factors, one imported factor, and Ujo out-
puts. However, we assume the production functions to be of the following
special forr;:
X = X[G (K ,L ), I ] (IV. 1)
X XX X
Y= Y[Gy(Ky,L^). ly] (IV.2)
iC + K ^ K (IV. 3)
X y
L + L ^ L (IV.4)
X y
X[
, ], Y[ , ], G ( , ), G ( , ) are each assumed to be homogenousX y
of decree one in its two arguments. Thus, there is no direct substitution
amonc; the domestic factors (K and L) , on the one hand, and the imported factor
This knife-edge model has other, analytically-interesting properties.
For example, note that, if factor-intensity reversals can occur (thanlcs to
the two industries having CES production functions V7ith different elasticities
of substitution, for example) , they will not be ruled out because the economy
has a given factor endowment: the fact that the supply of factor 'i' is
variable permits the economy to go from one side of the factor- intensity
crossover point to the other.
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(I), on the other hand. However, unlike in Model II, a. and a. will not be
' XX ly
fixed but irLll vary now as a function of the domestic (P /P.). It follows
X 1
that the equilibrium ratio of the two domestic factors employed in production
in each activity will depend only on the price-ratio of these factors (and
not as well on the relative price of the imported input)
.
Differentiating the model successively with respect to output and input
tariff change, and solving for output and primary factor utilisation in the
production of each of the two goods, we can readily show that the three ERP
definitions fail to give accurate resource-allocational predictions. However,
the ERP definition in terms of proportionate increment in the price of value
added will v;ork accurately in predicting the priraary-factor-allocational
effect of the tariff structure but not the gross-output change.
ft
In this sense, Model IV is a generalization of itodel II. On the other
hand, it is also a generalization of Model III in another sense. In fiodel III,
the imported input-coefficients (a^^'s) varied v/ith the relative price of out-
put to import input (P /P., P /P.). But there v/as onlv one domestic factor,
its wage constituting value-added. How, the structure of the production
function basically remains the same: but this domestic factor, in turn
,
is a
product of two nrlnan.' domestic factors: K and T,. Thus,
;: = x(v^,i^)
Y = Y(V ,1 )
y y
ts now turning into:
X = X(V ,1 ): V = G (L ,K )XX X XXX
Y = Y(V ,1 ); V = G (L ,K )
y y y y y y
and V , V can then be construed as ''value-added" factors, (produced by the
X y > .
domestic factors K and L) , which enter the production functions of the two
outputs, A and Y. This model has been introduced into the ERP literature bv
Corden (1969) and extensively discussed by him (1971).
Corden (1969) incorrectly seems to list this property, and the earlier
propertv that the imported input per unit of output depends onlv on the price
of this input relative to the price of the output, as independent restrictions
on the nature of substitution between imported and domestic factors in his
analysis. UoK'jever ^ as stated above, and as proven in the Appendix, the latter
restriction implies the former.
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To see this clearly, note that in our present model, with substitution
anionp the domestic and imported factors constrained in the highly restrictive
fashion already defined, G = G (K ,L ) and G (K ,L ) can be construed as
X XXX y V y
value-added' production functions; and, given linear homogeneity, a natural
physical unit for the "value-added product' in each process, could be defined
as G (1, 1) and G (1, 1) respectively. Havin^ defined these units, we can
describe the solution of the model as follows. Given the price per unit of
output of a process and its imported input price, the ratio of the value-added
product to the imported input (in production) is determined by equating the
marginal value product of the imported input to its price. Simultaneously
the "price" of the value-added product in this process also emerges— it is
simply the marginal value product of the "value-added product." Having
determined the "prices" of value-added products in each process, their ratio
uniquely determines the domestic factor allocations just as in the traditional.
Model I. And hence if a tariff structure raises the "price" of the "value-
added product' in one process relatively to the other, that process gains both
domestic factors at the expense of the other. ITiis is the same as saying that
if ERP > ERP (where ERP's are defined in terms of the "price'' of value-
X y
added product) then process x will gain domestic factors at the expense of
process y.
But this does not necessarily mean that the output of process x goes
up. This can be readily explained. Suppose the tariff structure raises the
ratio of the value-added nroduct to the imported input in both processes. If
the output of the value-added product in the process that gains domestic
llie linear homogeneity of X[
, ] and Y[ , ] is crucial for these
two calculations.
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factors rises by a smaller percentage than the rise in the ratio of the value-
added product to the imported input in this process, then the total use of
the imported input in this process must fall. llius this process gains domes-
tic factors while losing imported inputs. Hence its output need not rise.
Note thus that, as with Model III, an "appropriate" definition of ERP
can be devised, i.e. the proportionate increment in the "price of value-
added." which will correctlv predict resource-allocational effects (although
now only for primary, domestic factor allocations) but that this definition
ap.ain reauires that the seneral equilibrium system be solved before it can
be computed. Hence we are again in the situation where the ERP index that
works is no longer one which can be used in lieu of the solution to the
general equilibrium system and hence one may well ask what use it is when we
already know the resource allocational shifts once the general equilibrium
system has been solved. In brief, the information required for the correct
ERP computation includes the answer to the question which, once the ERP index
is computed, that index v,^ill heln to answer!
If we now take stock of the analysis so far, we have considered a
succession of models ^mere some ERP index \7orked. In all these cases, ho^7-
ever, we could work with either a natural, physical unit in which we could
measure value added (Model III) £r a de facto physical unit in which we could
measure value added (;iodel IV) ojr a derived unit, related to output, in vjhich
we could measure value added ("lodels I and II) . Furthermore, whereas in the
case of "todels I aiid II, we could also use the 'traditional'' ERP definitions
listed in Section I, in the case of llodels III and IV, which permitted sub-
stitution among traded and domestic factors of production, we had to resort
entirely to the "new" ERP definition in teriTiS of the proportionate increment
in the 'price of value added': and this turned out to be open to the objection
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that it required information whose availability/calculation made the ERP
calculation unnecessary anyway.
V.'e now proceed to discussing a model, developed by R.amaswami and
Srinivasan (1971). which leads to an "impossibility theorem': there exists
no definition of ERP which can correctly predict (in every case) the resource-
allocational impact of a tariff structure.
V : Tlie Ramaswami-Srinivasan "Impossibility" Theorem
Ramaswami and Srinivasan (19 71) considered a model which permits
generalized substitution among one imported and two domestic factors, all
three of which produce two final outputs. This model is readily formalised
as follows:
X = X(K ,L ,1 ) (V.l)XXX
.
Y = Y(Ky,Ly,I^) (V.2)
K + K ^ K (V.3)
X y
L + L < L (V.4)
X y
This model differs from Model IV only insofar as it allows for generalised
substitution between the imported factor (I) and the primary, domestic factors
(K and L)
.
Tliey showed by means of a numerical example that, in this case, it is
impossible to predict the wav domestic factors will move and relative out-
puts will change, following on the imposition of a tariff on the imported fac-
tor, without bringing into consideration the endowments of the domestic factors .
Tlius if the domestic factor endowments took one set of parametric values, then
25.
the same tariff on the imported factor, with the same production functions
and foreif^n prices, would pull both domestic factors to one process whereas
another set of parametric values for the domestic factor endowment had pulled
these factors to the other process. ITius they succeeded in showing that no
ERP index could be devised which could invariably predict resource-allocational
chan,'5es resulting from tariff imposition on imported inputs (and by analogy
on outputs) which ignored the domestic factor endowments.
Computing the three 'traditional' ERP measures in Section I, they
underlined this conclusion by showing how each would fail to predict correctly.
In their numerical example, the functional fom of one of the two production
functions ruled out (as is the case for both production functions stated in
the model here) the possibility of defining a physical, de facto or derived
unit in a way which vjould permit resort to the "new'' ERP definition in terms
of nroportionate increase in the 'price of value added." Hence, that definition
was also inanpronriate.
VI: Conclusions
Our analvsis leads us to conclude^ soriewhat nihilistically , that a
measure of KRP which will unfailinely predict the domestic resource shift
consequent on a change in tariff structure does not exist in general. Even
It may also be useful to contrast the Ramasv7a:.Tii-Srinivasan model with
iiodel IV from yet another angle. In Model IV. any change in the tariff struc-
ture changes the equilibrium ratio of the dorestic factors in the sane direction
in i)oth urocesses so that one nrocess gains or loses both domestic factors due
to the c'aanpe in the tariff structure. In the Ramaswani-Srinivasan model, on
the other hand, a subsidy on the imported input can change, and in their exav.iple
does change, the domestic factor ratio in opposite directions for the two
processes. This means tiiat the aggregate cndo\jmcnt of primary, domestic fac-
tors has to be brought in to determine the resource-allocational impact. Note
therefore that we could devise alternative restrictions, to tliat embodied in
Model III, on the nature of substitution betv/een imported and doinestic factors
which would ensure that both primary factors move in the same direction in
both activities and hence enable us to predict resource-allocational shifts
with a suitable ERP definition.
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in the highly-restrictive situations where a measure can be shovrn to exist,
.generally
the inf orr.;ation required for its computation subsunes the ansx^er to the
prediction problem which ERP computation is supposed to provide.
lliis nihilistic conclusion is reinforced by three further observations:
(1) llecent studies, by Cohen (1969) and Guisinger and Schvdlovjsky (1970);
of the relationship between tlie (calculated) noiainal tariffs and ERP's in a
number of empirical studies have shown that a remarkably high correlation
exists between tliem: thus raising the question whether it is useful to spend
vast resources on calculating ERP's vjhen nominal tariffs seem to be adequate
proxies for tliem anvway.
(2) The most that, in a multi-commodity world, the ERP's could tell us
ideally was that, if the different processes were ranked bv their ERP's in a
chain, the liighest-ERP process would have gained resources and the lowest-
ERP process would have lost them, in relation to the pre-trade situation.
As with nominal tariffs, the scope of purely "qualitative economics" does
not go beyond this, so that once again the vast empirical effort required
in making up the ERP numbers seems grossly disproportionate to X'jhat can be
done to predict actual resource-allocational impacts of the tariff structure
without resort to the full general-equilibrium solution.
(3) It also needs to be emphasised that the recent attempt at arguing
that the constancy of the (imported-factor) a 's is a reasonable restriction
because raw materials do not substitute with domestic factors and are in a
fairly fixed proportion to output is based on a false eouation of the imported
factors with intermediates and raw materials: most economies impor t capi-
tal goods and these do^ substitute with (domestic) labour quite generally.
And, indeed, it is not at all uncommon for there to be substitution between
However, as our companion paper shows, even this much cannot be
asserted for Model III, for example.
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intermediates and primary factors, though admittedly this is less important
in practice than the substitution amon?^ the primary factors, capital and
labour.
It seems clear that while the original stimulus to the ERP theory was
given by the auestion as to whether an index could be devised to predict re-
source allocation correctly in the presence of traded factors with their
attendant complication of tariff structures, this is a dead-end. Inhere does
ERP theory go from here then?
Two fresh questions seem to us to be of interest to explore at this
stage:
(1) Insofar as neither nominal-tariff nor ERP rankings are adequate,
in theory, to predict the resource-allocational effects of tariff structures
correctly when the general (Ramaswami-Srinivasan) case is considered, can
we still rank the two measures by their relative performance in this regard
under alternative, 'probable" parametric situations?
(2) Since current tariff negotiations, as in the Kennedy Round, in-
volve across-the-board tariff cuts in nominal tariffs, what economic dif-
ferences would ensue (e.g. the impact on the welfare of the tariff-cutting
trading nations) if the tariff cuts were made instead in ERP's?
For examples, ee Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1971)
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APPEND LX
(I)
Let HCKjLji-l) be the production function vzhere K,L are domestic primary fac-
K H
tors, li is homogenous of degree one and concave. Let x = —
, y = — and
h = --. Tlien it is clear that h = li(x,l,y) = h(x,y). If H is of the form
i-i
F[0(K,L) jil] , where F and C are homogenous of degree one in their arguments,
then h(x,y) = y f(-^^^) where f(z) = F(z,l) and g(x) = G(x,l)
.
It is siiown below that the condition that the input coefficient of imported
Vinput, i.e.
—-r~^—r» depends only on its price relative to output price im-h(x,y) ^-
e(x)
plies h(x,v) is of tVie form v i{-^ ).
y
Proof^: Under conoetitive conditions, the iV'arfrinal product of the imported
input, i.e. h^(x,y) (where the subscript 2 denotes the partial derivative
v/ith respect to the second argument) equals the ratio of the price of the
imported input to the price of output. VJe can therefore restate the above
condition equivalently as:
^;-'^ = j[h2(x,v)]
or
h(x,y) = v JTn^Cx.v)] (1)
where J is an increasing function.
L,et Z = h,.(x,y). Differentiating both sides of (1) partially with respect
to X ue. get (with subscript i denoting the partial derivative of a function
i/ith respect to its i^h argument):
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Z = J(Z) + V J^(Z)Z2
or
1 -^l^^^
- = — -— z n)
y Z-J(Z) '^2 ^^
Let P(Z) = / r,—YTyT '^'^* ^'- ^^ clear that P(Z) is an increasing function of
7. since P (Z) > because J (Z) > and Z > J(Z). Tnen (2) implies:
^(Losv) =|;^{P(Z)} (3)
Inteeratinc.we r;et P(Z) = Loq -—,—r- = - Lor ^^—^^ where p(x) is the '"constant"o>
. g(x) y
of integration. Inverting this function and substituting in (1) we get:
h(x,y) = y J[P~^ {-Loa iiiii}]
= y f(^) (4) O.r.D.
(II)
It is shown below that condition (1) implies that the ratio of the inarpinal
products of the two domestic factors denend onlv on their ratio x. Tliis
means that x f;ets determined uniquely once the price-ratio of the domestic
factors is soecified.
Proof: Differentiating (1) partial^' xjith resocct to x and v respectively
we get:
hj^(x,y) = y J^(Z)Zj^ = y J^ (Z)h2j^ (5)
h2(x,y) = J(Z)4y J^(Z)Z2 = J(Z)+y Jj^(Z)h,^ (6)
h-xh^-yh^ =
-V Jj^(Z)[x h^j^-Hy h22] (7)
Now h^ is the marginal product of K and(h-x h -y h-)is the marginal product
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of L. Hence from (5) and (7) we pet that ratio of the marginal product
of the two domestic factors. Thus:
h-xhj^-yh^ (xh^-i+vh--)
or
^1 ^21
^21 (-xh^^+yh^^)
or
or
(8)
h^ h-xh^-yh»
97 '^°^ ^1 = 37 ^°S (h-xh^-yh2)
J,
h-xh^-yh-
(and intepratinp)
or
fi-xh -yh
~ = e(x) (10)
1
v/here e(x) is a function onlv of x. O.E.D.
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